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What Should Lawyers Know
About Economics?
Robert Whaples, Andrew P. Morriss, and John C. Moorhouse
Law and Economics is now part of the curriculum at many American law
schools; the current AALS directory lists 159 persons teaching at least one
course in the area. Because law schools inexplicably do not generally require a
background in economics, such courses usually must teach some principles of
economic analysis before applying those principles to legal questions. We
wondered what law-and-economics scholars and economists thought lawyers
should know about economics' (as opposed to what they should know about
the economic analysis of law). The results are important beyond the circle of
law-and-economics scholars. Teachers and students of torts, property, and
contracts felt the impact of the first wave of law-and-economics scholarship,
but every area of law from admiralty to procedure is increasingly subject to
economic reasoning.
Even those legal educators and lawyers who swore off economics after an
encounter with an undergraduate principles course are confronting eco-
nomic reasoning in scholarly work and judicial opinions. Understanding that
reasoning requires some familiarity with economics. The optimal number of
economics courses may always be one more (at least in our opinions), but
those whose consumption of economics education has somehow fallen short
may reasonably substitute the works economists-and particularly economists
who think about law-think are important for lawyers.
To find out what law-and-economics scholars and economists think lawyers
should know about economics, we conducted surveys of random samples of
members of the American Law and Economics Association and the American
Economic Association.2 We posed two questions to both groups:
At Wake Forest University, Robert Whaples is Associate Professor of Economics, and John C.
Moorhouse is Professor of Economics. Andrew P. Morriss is Associate Professor of Law and
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1. Perhaps our next project will be to determine what lawyers think law-and-economics scholars
should know about law.
2. Between April and August 1996 we sent 402 surveys to members of the ALEA and 199 surveys
to members of the ABA. Fourteen of the ALEA surveys and eight of the AEA surveys were
returned as undeliverable. We received 63 usable responses from ALEA members (a 16.2%
response rate) and 70 from AEA members (a 36.6% response rate). ALEA members were
also asked 42 questions on a number of policy issues and factual propositions, something
which may explain their lower response rate. Those results appear in Andrew Morriss et al.,
Where Is There Consensus in the Field of Law and Economics? (unpublished manuscript on
file with authors).
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What Should Lawyers Know About Economics ?
What do you think are the five most important economic concepts law
students ought to learn in a law-and-economics course?
Law-and-economics courses sometimes include economics articles in
their reading lists. If you could choose up to five articles for such a
course, what would they be?
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the answers.3
Table 1: Concepts Mentioned
Opportunity cost / diminishing returns
Externalities / Coase Theorem
Marginal analysis
Demand & supply / market equilibrium




Economics of property rights
Transactions costs
Present value / discounting
Utility theory / social welfare
Market structure / monopoly
Uncertainty / risk
Competition








Consumer & producer surplus
Public goods





























As Table 1 shows, four concepts ranked well ahead of the others: opportu-
nity cost, the Coase theorem, marginal analysis, and market equilibrium.
Economic efficiency/Pareto optimality also ranked fairly high among the
ALEA economists, although not so high among members of the AEA. Four of
these five concepts are at the heart of the microeconomic core, and the fifth,
the Coase Theorem, is the key to much of law and economics generally.
Missing from the top tier are concepts at the center of modern
microeconomics such as principal-agent theory and property rights econom-
ics. Macroeconomic topics are also noticeably absent. This suggests that our
respondents (correctly, in our opinion) are satisfied with exposing law stu-
dents to an abbreviated introductory microeconomics course rather than
familiarizing them with recent cutting-edge law-and-economics scholarship.
3. Because we asked open-ended questions, we used somejudgment in grouping responses. For
example, "opportunity cost" includes mention of diminishing marginal utility and scarcity.
For reasons of space, we listed only concepts and materials identified by at least two
respondents; half-point scores reflect a few respondents' listing two concepts as equally
important.
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Table 2: Articles Recommended
Percent
Mentioning
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) .............................. 57.9
*Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra4 85 HAv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) ....... 11.3
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA 386 (1937) ........................... 8.3
Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968) ................................................................................................... 6.0
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978) .................................................................................... 5.6
*Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REv. 347 (1967) ...................................................................................................... 5.3
Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
Posrriw ECONOMICS 3 (1953) ................................................................................. 4.5
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972) ................................... 4.5
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Qualitative Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) ........................................... 4.5
GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. &
M GMr. Sci. 3 (1971) ............................................................................................... 3.8
Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALSIS OF LAw (1972, 5th ed. 1998) ....................... 3.8
*Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) ................... 3.4
Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) ........ 3.0
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) ........... 3.0
*Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) .............. 3.0
tR. A. Radford, The Economic Organization of a P.O. W. Camp, 12
ECONOMICA 189 (1945) ........................................................................................... 2.3
tGary Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957, 2d ed. 1971) ..................... 2.3
*GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) ......... 2.3
*Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) ............................................. 2.3
*Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN.
ECO N. 305 (1976) .................................................... ......................................... 1.9
tRichard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGA. STUD. 29 (1972) .................... 1.5
tJohn S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case,
1J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958) ...................................................................................... 1.5
tHarold Demsetz, Indushy Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy,
16J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973) ........................................................................................ 1.5
tStephen N. S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice
of Contractual Arrangements, 12J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969) ........................................ 1.5
*Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) ................................. 1.5
*CarlJ. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979) ................ 1.5
*Friedrich von Hayek, Competition as Discovery Procedure, in F. A. Hayek,
ed., NEw STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, PoLmcs, ECONOMICS, AND THE HIsToRY OF
IDEAS 179 (1978) .................................................................................................... 1.5
*William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW (1987) .................................................................................................... 1.5
*Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capita Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 A. ECON. REv. 261 (1958) ..................... 1.5
*Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw (1987) ................................... 1.5
* mentioned only by ALEA respondents
t mentioned only by AEA respondents
What Should Lawyers Know About Economics?
A similar focus is apparent in the suggested readings of Table 2. Respon-
dents in both groups focus heavily on "classic" texts and articles: all but five of
the thirty works mentioned were published before 1980.4 Not surprisingly, the
respondents also concentrate heavily on articles from the Journal of Law and
Economics (7 articles receiving 95.5 mentions) and the Journal of Legal Studies (5
articles receiving 16 mentions). Of articles not in law-and-economicsjournals,
only one (Calabresi & Melamed) is from a law journal; the others are from
economics journals (10 articles receiving 53.5 mentions) or books (6 books
receiving 20 mentions). Since we had asked for "economics" articles a law
student should read, the absence of law reviews may seem unsurprising. But
there are plenty of articles published in law reviews that contain just as much
economics (and certainly as much law and economics) as material published
elsewhere. Our results suggest that neither law-and-economics scholars nor
economists think of law review materials as "economics" articles.
For the most part, the readings suggested are relatively nontechnical ar-
ticles comprehensible to most law students; only a few, such as Akerlof's,
might tax most students' abilities. The desire to choose material within the
competence of law students may have led to the selection of older articles-
articles written before the mathematization of economics.
The most striking response, although not unexpected, was the top rank-
ing-by a wide margin-of Ronald Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost."
Clearly this is the key element in the law-and-economics syllabus. More than
three-fourths of the respondents gave it a mention; only 15 percent men-
tioned the second-most-mentioned article. Another Coase article, "The
Nature of the Firm," ranked third.
The major difference between the two groups surveyed was in their treat-
ment of the Calabresi & Melamed article. Many ALEA members listed it, but
the AEA members did not mention it at all. Apparently law-and-economics
scholars read law reviews, but economists outside the field do not







*A. Douglas Melamed 11.3
George Stigler 10.5
tGary Becker 8.3
* mentioned only by ALEA respondents
t mentioned only by AEA respondents
4. The AEA and ALEA responses to this question were generally similar, with two exceptions
noted below, and so Table 2 combines the results.
5. Another difference lies in the works that relatively few respondents cited: with one exception,
every work mentioned by fewer than five persons received mention from members of only
one of the two groups.
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Another way of interpreting our results is to look for authors mentioned
repeatedly. Certainly many law-and-economics scholars have published widely,
and some authors' writings lack an obvious focal point like "The Problem of
Social Cost." Almost anything by Richard Posner, for example, would be
relevant. Table 3 lists authors mentioned ten or more times. Not surprisingly,
Coase's name tops the list, although large numbers of respondents mentioned
Armen Achian, Gary Becker, Guido Calabresi, Harold Demsetz, Richard
Posner, and George Stigler. Teachers might wish to include in their syllabi
works by frequently mentioned authors as representative of the field.
Teachers can use the suggested articles to introduce students to the con-
cepts identified in Table 1. The non-Coase readings come from a variety of
areas, from torts to property rights to finance. The wide range of subject areas
suggests materials that could be used in substantive courses to provide a law-
and-economics perspective, particularly for students who have mastered basic
economic principles either in their undergraduate course work or in a law-
and-economics course.
There are.two major textbooks (Cooter & Ulen 6 and Posner7) and two
casebooks for law-and-economics courses (Barnes & Stout8 and Goetz9). In
addition there are some shorter works that provide an introduction to law and
economics (Harrison, 10 Malloy," and Polinsky12). All cover the five concepts
that our respondents identified as most important, as well as some additional
topics. Cooter & Ulen provide the most thorough introduction to economic
reasoning and come closest to replicating the experience of an introductory
microeconomics course by more formal presentation. Any of the shorter
works could also serve as back-up reading for lectures on these concepts.
The textbook format allows for greater topical coverage but at the expense
of primary sources. The articles suggested by our respondents offer a source of
supplemental readings. The Barnes & Stout casebook includes significant
excerpts from Coase; the Goetz casebook does not.
If you wish to take our respondents' collective advice, you might structure
your law-and-economics course to include a brief overview of basic
microeconomic concepts, discussion of Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost,"
discussion of Calabresi & Melamed's "Cathedral" article, and selections from
one or more of the frequently mentioned writers: Alchian, Becker, Demsetz,
Posner, and Stigler.
6. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 2d ed. (Reading, Mass., 1997).
7. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th ed. (NewYork, 1998).
8. David W. Barnes & Lynn A. Stout, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics (St. Paul,
1992). This book is also available as a series of short paperbacks focused on individual
subjects for use as supplemental material.
9. CharlesJ. Goetz, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics (St. Paul, 1984).
10. Jeffrey L Harrison, Law and Economics in a Nutshell (St. Paul, 1995).
11. Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice
(St. Paul, 1990).
12. A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 2d ed. (Boston, 1989).
